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Abstract
In 2012, the Government invited local councils in England to participate in a pilot
programme to test direct payments in residential care. While the programme was set up to
allow for comprehensive summative evaluation, the uptake of direct payments in residential
care was substantially lower than anticipated, with only 40 people in receipt of one at the end
of the programme. Drawing on qualitative data collected for the evaluation, this paper aims to
understand better the barriers to implementing direct payments in residential care. Evidence
from the use of direct payments in domiciliary care identified gatekeeping by council frontline
staff as a major barrier for service users to access direct payments. Our findings suggest that,
whilst selectivity of both service users and providers was an integral part of the programme
design, gatekeeping does not fully explain the poor take-up. Other factors played a part, such
as lack of clarity about the benefits of direct payments for care home residents, the limited
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range and scope of choice of services for residents, and concerns from care providers about the
financial impact of direct payments on their financial sustainability.
Introduction
Direct Payments, or cash payments provided to individuals to pay for their
long-term care needs, are increasingly the Government’s preferred method of
providing support to those eligible for council-funded adult social care in England
(DH, 2014). The idea is that service users can exercise greater choice and have
more control over the services they receive by managing their own budgets.
The expectation is that services will then be more personalised and better meet
their needs. Such ‘cash for care’ schemes have been introduced in a number
of countries, with many of them also providing cash payments to residents in
care homes (Angeles Tortosa and Granell, 2002: Da Roit and Le Bihan, 2010).
However in England, until recently, direct payments have only been available to
those requiring care and support services in their own homes.
In 2011, the Law Commission recommended that the Government considered
making direct payments available to people in residential care:
‘extending direct payments to cover residential accommodation [ . . . ] would give some service
users greater choice and control over the provision of accommodation and would mean they no
longer have to rely on their preferences being acknowledged and implemented by local authority
staff. Although direct payments would not be suitable for all people moving into residential care,
in many cases the option of direct payments will be appropriate and we see no reason in principle
for excluding people merely on the basis of the type of service being provided.’ (Law Commission,
2011: 102–103)
In response to this recommendation, the Government initiated a pilot
programme to test the introduction of direct payments in residential care in
20 councils in England (HM Government, 2012). Its 2012 White Paper states:
‘As part of our ambition to help more people experience the benefits of a direct payment, we will
develop, in a small number of areas, the use of direct payments for people who have chosen to live
in residential care, in order to test this approach. [ . . . ] It will help us to understand better how
direct payments in residential care might work in practice, and what the costs and benefits of this
approach might be for people using residential care, local authorities, care providers, and families.’
(HM Government, 2012: 55)
An evaluation of the processes and impacts of introducing direct payments
in residential care was conducted between January 2014 and June 2016. This
was preceded by a nine-month ‘preparatory phase’ to allow pilot sites to think
through the implications of offering direct payments to care home residents. It
was during this time that the Government committed itself to introduce direct
payments in residential care in all areas in England in April 2016, therefore
turning the ‘pilots’ into ‘trailblazers’. This announcement greatly increased the
expectations of councils that participated as ‘trailblazer sites’ which now saw
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themselves at the forefront of implementing direct payments rather than just
‘testing’ them.
In a scoping and feasibility study in 2013, project leads indicated that they
anticipated a total of over 400 people receiving a direct payment to pay for their
residential care by the end of the programme (Ettelt et al., 2013). However, when
the programme formally ended in September 2015, only 71 service users had
accepted a direct payment and, of these, only 40 were in receipt of a payment.
Six sites officially withdrew from the programme at different stages, whilst a
further four had not reported issuing any direct payments by the end of the
programme (Ettelt et al., 2017). The low uptake of direct payments had significant
implications for the evaluation of the trailblazer programme, as it limited the
possibility of robustly assessing the impact of direct payments on service users and
their families, care homes and councils. Given the difficulties in implementing
direct payments in residential care in trailblazing sites, the Government decided
to postpone the national implementation of the programme from 2016 to at least
2020.
This paper presents findings from the evaluation of the trailblazers,
particularly using data from interviews with project leads, council staff, and
owners and managers of care homes. It aims to understand why implementing
direct payments in residential care was less successful than initially expected.
These findings capture the first experience of direct payments in residential
care in England. To date, there are few studies of direct payments or similar
schemes being introduced in care homes internationally. Although there are a
few studies of ‘cash for care’ schemes that also extend to care-home residents,
these do not examine the barriers to their implementation (Da Roit and Le
Bihan, 2010). An exception is the study by Angeles Tortosa and Granell (2002)
who evaluated the introduction of nursing home vouchers in the Valencia region
in Spain. They found that the scheme had expanded the supply of publicly funded
places in care homes and therefore improved choice of care homes for service
users, yet this expansion also involved higher costs (Angeles Tortosa and Granell,
2002).
Barriers to implementing direct payments in domiciliary care
There is now substantial experience of implementing direct payments and
other ‘cash for care’ schemes in England and elsewhere (Ottmann et al., 2009;
Gadsby et al., 2013). In England, direct payments in adult social care have been
available for selected groups and services since 1996 with some councils offering
direct payments even before they became national policy. More recently, direct
payments have become the Government’s preferred mechanism for meeting
individuals’ domiciliary care needs. However, the uptake of direct payments in
the community has remained relatively low (DH, 2005; Ellis, 2007; Fernandez
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et al., 2007; May et al., 2007; Priestley et al., 2007; Taylor, 2008; Carr and Robbins,
2009). In 2013–14, only about 15 per cent of adults who received council-funded
domiciliary care opted for a direct payment, with the remainder having their
social care services managed by their council (NAO, 2016).
From early on, direct payments have attracted controversy. They have
appealed to advocates of the disability movement as providing a mechanism to
increase the autonomy of people with disabilities vis-a-vis councils and providers.
They have also been advertised as an approach to increase choice and control
and a solution to the perceived problem of welfare dependency (Leadbeater et al.,
2008). However, others have argued that concerns about welfare dependency
were a distraction to promote neoliberal ideas rather than a concern voiced by
professionals or users (Ferguson, 2007). By casting service users as ‘consumers’,
direct payments would shift responsibility from professionals to individuals,
support the privatisation of service provision and deskill the care workforce in the
process (Ferguson, 2007; Ferguson, 2011; Daly, 2012). The focus on choice would
also underplay the public nature of decisions about care provision, especially
where such care is publicly funded (Stevens et al., 2011). Ferguson (2007) puts
forward the criticism that direct payments build on a flawed conception of the
people who use adult social care, by casting dependency as not only undesirable
but as illegitimate. There is evidence that direct payments have unequal effects
on different user groups, with studies showing that older people are less likely
to benefit than younger people (Rabiee, 2013; Callaghan and Towers, 2014; Lewis
and West, 2014; Woolham et al., 2015).
Establishing direct payments in community care has turned out to require
complex changes to professional practice (Carmichael and Brown, 2002; Glasby
and Littlechild, 2002; Ellis, 2007). Fernandez and colleagues (2007) identified two
narratives that have emerged from the analyses of the barriers to implementing
direct payments in domiciliary care. One narrative focuses on attributing barriers
to ‘resistance’ from professionals arising from the attitudes and behaviours of
council staff such as social workers, or care managers, but also from local
leadership and senior management. This narrative sees direct payments as a
challenge to enduring (but seemingly outdated) professional norms and a general
aversion to change among public sector workers that has led frontline staff to
act as gatekeepers to direct payments (Glasby and Littlechild, 2002; Taylor, 2008;
Priestley et al., 2010).
The second narrative emphasises structural and contextual factors as the
main barriers to implementation, especially constraints in social care funding, the
structure of the adult social care market and the mutual dependencies between
providers, commissioners and recipients of council-funded care (Glendinning
et al., 2008). From this perspective, it is argued that direct payments can only be
useful to service users if the care market provides sufficient services to choose
from, and if there is sufficient funding available for users to access these choices.
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This is especially relevant for older people since funding is lower for them than
for younger adults (Humphries et al., 2016).
Methods
This paper draws on all the data collected for the evaluation from January 2014 to
February 2016, but especially on semi-structured interviews conducted with those
leading the project in each trailblazer site (n=26), council and care home staff
(n=41) as well as service users (n=10) and their family members or advocates
(n=25) (Table 1). Project leads in all sites were interviewed twice during the
evaluation, in autumn 2014 and summer/autumn 2015. Project leads in four sites
selected for in-depth study identified council and care home staff involved in
the project who were then invited by the research team to participate in an
interview. ‘In-depth’ sites were selected to cover a spread of sites offering direct
payments to different service user groups (e.g. older people; younger adults with
physical or cognitive disability; adults with mental health problems); sites offering
different types of direct payments (e.g. ‘full’, ‘part’ and ‘additional’ payments);
sites working with a few care homes or intending to make direct payments
available in all care homes; and sites in different regions of the country. A few
additional interviews were conducted in a fifth site, which was part of a case study
conducted to inform an interim report.
Service users and their family members who were offered a direct payment
in residential care were invited to participate in a survey to seek their views about
the process of being offered a direct payment and their satisfaction with their
direct payment if they had accepted one (or their reasons for declining the offer if
they had declined it). They were asked to indicate on the final page of the survey
questionnaire whether they would be available to be interviewed. In response
to low participation rates in the survey, a few additional service users with a
direct payment were identified by project leads and approached by the research
team with a request for an interview. Informed consent was obtained from all
interviewees.
Interviews with project leads explored their experience of setting up
the programme locally, the progress made and any barriers and challenges
experienced. Council and care home staff were asked about their understanding
of the purpose of the programme and about their experience during its
implementation. Interviews with service users and family members accepting
a direct payment explored their understanding of a direct payment, their
experience of the setting-up process and how they were using, or planning
to use, the payment, including whether they had experienced any benefit. For
those declining, questions focused on whether they had any prior knowledge or
experience of direct payments in the community, their experience of being offered
a direct payment in residential care and their reasons for declining. Interviews
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TABLE 1. Number of interviews per stakeholder group
Group Number of interviews
Service users 10
Family members/advocates 25
Council project leads 26
Council staff in 5 trailblazer sites, including social workers,
assistant practitioners, community care officers, change
managers, council brokers and commissioning managers
21
Care home owners and staff in 5 sites 19
were conducted face-to-face with the exception of interviews of project leads and
family members, which were conducted over the telephone. Interviews were tape
recorded and transcribed verbatim.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on the themes identified for the
evaluation. These included descriptive categories that aimed to understand how
direct payments were implemented in each site (e.g. the number and type of direct
payments available; processes of facilitating direct payments; the organisation
of the financial transaction; how direct payments were used) and themes that
explored the challenges experienced during the process of setting up and having
direct payments (e.g. information available about direct payments; approaches
to communication and engagement; difficulties setting up direct payments;
concerns about impacts of direct payments). For this paper, these themes were
reanalysed with the aim of identifying perceptions and experiences that could
help explain the lower than expected number of direct payments taken up by
care home residents. Themes that stood out centred on the demand for direct
payments from service users and their families; the availability of the supply of
services for which direct payments could be used; and the implications (perceived
or real) of direct payments on service provision in care homes.
A full account of the methods and the logic model used in the evaluation
has been published elsewhere (Ettelt et al., 2017). The methods were approved by
the Research Ethics Committee of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine and the Social Care Research Ethics Committee (14/IEC08/0011). The
evaluation team was not involved in the selection of sites or in designing local
implementation strategies, and aimed not to influence decisions by sites about
the selection of service users or care homes.
Setting up direct payments in residential care in trailblazing sites
Council staff developed different strategies for implementing the direct payment
trailblazer in care homes in their area and they implemented different types of
direct payments. An initial challenge was that councils had to decide how to
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determine the monetary value of direct payments. Normally, placements were
made by matching a person’s eligible assessed care needs with the supply of care
home places in an area, underpinned by block or spot contracts through which
the care-home fee was determined. These fees typically covered the entire costs
of care and accommodation provided to residents (except nursing costs met
by the NHS). These fees were often derived historically and, in some councils,
were highly variable for the same level of need. A resource allocation mechanism
that would match individual care needs with a sum of money, as it existed in
domiciliary care, was absent in many council areas. Personal budgets provided, if
not a mechanism to calculate a budget, then at least a statement of the allocated
sum. However, these were introduced in residential care only halfway through
the trailblazer in April 2015 and progress in implementing them varied widely
among sites.
Interviews with project leads suggested that councils employed a range
of approaches to calculating direct payments. Most councils initially aimed to
develop a resource allocation system similar to the one used to determine direct
payments in the community. This approach meant that the value of the direct
payment would be determined through the needs assessment process, and result
in a budget that could then be spent by the service user.
The second, and eventually more popular option, was to base the value of
the direct payment on the existing fees charged by care homes. This option was
preferred by most care homes participating in the scheme, as it minimised their
risk of facing financial losses as the needs-based resource allocation approach
might result in a lower budget available to a user than the fees currently paid. A
third option, chosen by two councils, was to pay a small sum as a direct payment
in addition to the existing care home fee (e.g. £20 per month). Project leads from
these councils noted that this approach was chosen in response to concerns from
providers about the possibility of losing income from direct payments if service
users chose to use their direct payment to fund additional services or activities.
Councils also varied in whether they offered direct payments that covered
the whole or only part of the care home fee, with some offering both options.
Decisions about the size of the direct payment in relation to the care home fee
were often determined in response to concerns from care home owners and
managers. For example, in some sites only ‘part’ direct payments were offered
due to concerns from providers that a ‘full’ direct payment would increase the
risk of service users or their families not paying their fees. However, councils
opting for ‘part’ direct payments typically required care homes to help determine
that part of the fee that could be made available to service users to be used more
flexibly. In consequence, such part direct payments tended to be modest for older
people because the fees paid to care homes by councils often did not allow for
much flexibility. They could be more substantial for younger adults with social
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care needs for whom additional funding was available to pay for daytime and
social activities.
Councils differed in their approaches to offering direct payments to service
users, with some working through several approaches sequentially when trying
to increase uptake. Most councils initially collaborated with selected providers,
for example by establishing or using an existing provider forum to promote the
idea of direct payments. They had earlier been requested to identify providers
that were willing to participate when applying to be included in the trailblazer
scheme. In a number of areas, councils also asked care homes, typically those with
whom they had good working relationships, to identify service users to whom a
direct payment could be offered and, in some cases, to offer direct payments to
them directly.
An alternative strategy was for social workers or care managers to identify
service users to whom direct payments would be offered. This approach was
chosen initially only by a small number of councils although it became more
popular as it became clear that relying on providers to promote the scheme
resulted in few users taking up direct payments, if any. Three councils decided to
make a universal offer of direct payments to all service users as part of the needs
assessment or care review, reasoning that extending direct payments to all service
users was the ultimate aim of the policy.
In consequence, direct payments differed between sites in how they were
calculated, how they related to care home fees currently charged by providers,
and how, and by whom, they were offered to service users and families.
Barriers to implementing direct payments in residential care
Three main barriers emerged from the analysis: (1) a lack of clarity about the
benefits of direct payments to residents in care homes and their families; (2) a
lack of clarity about how demand for personalisation, where it existed, could be
met within the current supply of residential care; and (3) concerns about the
potential financial impact of direct payments on care homes, especially if these
were expected to provide more choice within the current context of constrained
council funding for adult social care.
(1) Lack of clarity about the benefits of direct payments
While all council and care home staff interviewed welcomed the opportunity
to promote personalisation in residential care, many (but not all) felt unsure about
the benefits of direct payments for care home residents. This included council
staff and care home managers as well as family members who had declined a
direct payment. They noted that many people in residential care had high levels
of care needs that affected their ability to exercise, and thus benefit from, the
types of choice and control associated with direct payments.
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‘Yes, she couldn’t honestly make an informed choice. She couldn’t. We spoke about it, but it’s just so
difficult really. With [my daughter], one could almost get her to do or say whatever you wanted to,
depending on how you presented something, which is . . . well, she has a limited understanding.’
(Family member, Site 7)
While it was uncontested that a more person-centred approach to delivering
care would improve the quality of care in homes, it was less clear how
direct payments would translate into a more person-centred approach in
residential settings. This was especially a concern for people with severe cognitive
impairment (such as older people with advanced dementia and adults with severe
learning disabilities) for whom personalisation was seen as desirable but who were
less able to exercise choice and control without support from a third party.
Family members who had declined a direct payment and completed a
questionnaire mostly noted that they were happy with the care received by their
relatives and would not wish to take up a direct payment for that reason (with a few
noting that they also did not wish to disrupt their relationship with providers). In
some instances, in contrast, the direct payment (as a ‘full’ payment) was accepted
because family members felt it would allow them to have more control over
current or future care arrangements on behalf of their relative. However, no cases
were reported in which relatives had made use of this lever to negotiate better
care.
Council staff noted that in domiciliary care, most direct payments were used
to employ a personal assistant of the service user’s choice. In care homes, however,
this option was seen to be less feasible given the additional cost associated with
employing a separate carer. Such additional cost needed to be covered from the
budget available for the care home fee. There were also concerns from care home
managers and council staff about safeguarding other residents if, for example,
an untrained person were to be brought into the home as a carer. However,
no case was reported in which this problem materialised in practice during the
evaluation.
In many cases in which a direct payment was taken up, this was seen to
provide a solution to an existing problem, often related to the choice of care
home. For example, the direct payment was used to pay for a place in a desired
care home that would not have been available otherwise (e.g. because the council
did not contract with the home).
‘[the direct payment] means that she is in a care home of her choice, and the family’s choice actually,
because I guess that if we didn’t have the direct payment, if she needed care, she may have been told
to go into a specific home nominated maybe by social services or the local authority or whatever.’
(Family member, Site 17)
In this instance, the user chose to remain in a home that she was already
familiar with from previous respite stays. Without the direct payment, this
possibility would not have been available to her because the council had already
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exceeded the number of allocated places for which it had contracted with the
home. A few other examples were reported in which the direct payment was
used to pay for a care home of the user’s choice that might otherwise have been
unavailable – for example, when residents reached the funding threshold below
which they qualified for council funding and wished to stay in the same home.
However, in these cases, either the council or the service users’ families incurred
an additional cost (i.e. a higher rate or an increased ‘top up’).
Given the novelty and untested nature of direct payments in care homes,
many frontline staff in councils noted that they did not feel confident in
promoting direct payments to service users and families.
‘When somebody is actually asking me really in-depth questions, I don’t know the answers to them,
and I think . . . if we had an example in [council name], just one person, and then you could say
‘look, this is an example’, I think [it would] take a lot of the fear away, and it would certainly
give me more confidence, yes. I can tell people about [direct payments], the actual bare bones of it,
but the nitty-gritty of how it will run, I don’t know. So, it’s really difficult to promote something.’
(Social worker, Site 17)
Likewise, some service users and their families reported that they felt they
did not have sufficient information about the implications of having a direct
payment to enable them to judge whether having one would be a good idea.
This problem of adequately communicating the implications of having a
direct payment was also compounded by councils still having to come to grips
with the facilitation of direct payments in residential care, including determining
their monetary value. For ‘part’ direct payments, this would involve negotiating
with care homes about how the funding allocated to the care of a person could
be split to be able to make part of the money available to the person directly.
While this lack of experience can be expected in any new scheme, it was
striking that there was no established positive narrative about direct payments in
residential care to which frontline staff and others could relate. This contrasts with
the introduction of direct payments in the community, which was enthusiastically
supported by a broad range of advocates including service users, their families
and social care staff.
A number of providers and council staff also pointed out that family members
were not always prepared to become more involved in managing their relative’s
care and instead welcomed others taking on this responsibility. This was seen as
a particular problem for older people as they were often admitted to a care home
at an advanced stage of frailty or dementia:
‘But certainly the vast majority of people that go into residential care are older people. And most
of the older people go into residential care and their carers or family or friends just wanted the
most simple [sic] process possible. So in those cases, if they were offered a direct payment, that was
refused and they preferred for it to be directly commissioned by the council.’ (Project lead, Site 11)
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In some cases, it was not clear how service users would be able to benefit from
their direct payment. This was clearest in cases in which a ‘full’ direct payment
covered the entire care home fee, as this meant that the service user or family
member simply transferred the monies to the care home that previously had been
paid by the council, without creating additional choices for the user.
For ‘part’ direct payments, the expected benefit was dependent on the
size of the payment and on the existence, and knowledge, of alternatives to
existing services. This was most clear-cut for younger adults whose care attracted
additional funding for day activities which could be converted into a direct
payment and spent on other activities in or outside the home. For older people,
this was more difficult as they typically did not receive such a payment and
funding was more narrowly confined to covering personal care needs. Even in
those two councils in which the direct payment was offered to older people as
an additional small payment (£20 per month in one site and £25 per week in
the other), only a small number of direct payments were taken up (seven in the
first site, and two in the other) and care homes reported having had difficulties
in facilitating activities for this group, most of whom were frail elderly with or
without dementia. These experiences discouraged staff who, in one site, stopped
promoting direct payments to service users.
(2) Uncertain supply of options to choose from
There was also uncertainty about what the direct payment would be able
to achieve for service users within the care home market and whether having a
direct payment would lead to more options to choose from in and outside of care
homes. As previously stated, people taking up a full direct payment typically were
required to use the payment to cover the care home fee in full. However, those
with a part direct payment were expected to be able to spend this on services or
items other than those included in the usual ‘care package’. In a number of cases,
service users chose to use their direct payments to participate in day services or
other activities outside the care home. This was feasible where the direct payment
equated to an existing day service supplement to be used for activities funded
by the council and where additional service options were available. Fee levels for
this supplement varied widely, but could be as high as £181 per week.
Alternatively, some care homes provided services or organised activities
that service users wished to participate in and which could be paid for with
the part direct payment (e.g. a visit to the garden centre, theatre or local
pub). However, some care home managers and owners indicated that they had
difficulties organising the additional carer support required to enable residents
to participate in their chosen activities outside the home. Such participation
was possible, as demonstrated in a number of examples, but required dedicated
organisational support, sometimes in excess of the support funded by the direct
payment. In one site, in which the council provided additional funding for direct
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payments, council staff spoke of the burden on relatives to organise carer support
despite the fact that the scheme could draw on a dedicated carer agency that
the council used in domiciliary care. There were also additional costs involved in
organising transport and entrance fees (e.g. for visits to the theatre or exhibitions)
for carers which were not covered by the direct payment.
Some council staff and care home managers also discussed the idea that care
homes could use the opportunity of the direct payment scheme to distinguish
themselves from competitors by developing strategies to attract service users
with a direct payment, but how this was to be achieved was not obvious. There
was also the question of how offering individualised services to residents with a
direct payment would fit into the current approach of pooling resources across
residents (typically including those funding their own care). Some smaller care
homes and those providing care for older people noted in particular that they felt
unable to move to a different approach to costing and providing services due to
current funding constraints. One project lead commented that ‘the [care home]
market was not ready’ to support direct payments both in relation to having the
costing approach in place and with regard to offering more diverse services that
would allow for more flexibility and choice.
In acknowledgement of these constraints in service supply, several frontline
staff and project leads mentioned attempts to improve relations with the local
voluntary sector, for example, to provide more community-based support for
daytime activities for residents in care homes. However, the involvement of the
voluntary sector in residential care observed during the programme was highly
variable, with some homes having established relationships with volunteer groups
and charities, often for younger adults with physical disabilities, while others had
few or no support networks.
(3) Potential financial impact of direct payments
With the few exceptions mentioned above, trailblazer councils expected to
implement direct payments ‘cost neutrally’, i.e. without incurring additional costs
(other than the costs of running a trailblazer scheme for which the Department of
Health provided a grant). This meant that money made available as a direct pay-
ment had to be taken from the funding assigned by the council to a person based
on his/her eligible assessed care needs (under the new regulations this equates to
people’s ‘personal budget’). This is in line with the approach in the community
of individuals having a personal budget that can be taken as a direct payment.
Managers and owners of care homes noted that both ‘part’ and ‘full’ direct
payments presented financial risks to providers. The full payment raised questions
about the course of action to be taken if a service user or their family member
failed to pay for his or her care. Questions were raised about whether the care
home would be expected to absorb this risk, whether the councils would be able
to provide financial support to care homes in such cases, and whether care homes
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would be expected and able to give residents notice to leave the home in case of
default on payment. Care home managers and owners argued that part of the
reason why they accepted lower rates from council-supported users than from
self-funders was that council-funded clients posed less risk to providers than self-
funding service users; councils would be less likely to default on payment of care
home fees than individual service users or their family members. Providers felt
that they were now being asked to accept greater financial risk whilst providing
the same, or even better services.
‘If someone’s on a full payment . . . how do we know we’re going to get paid? What happens if the
local authority has given this individual the money, they’ve spent the money and they’ve not paid
my fees; where do I get my money from?’ (Care home manager, Site 8)
Providing a ‘part’ direct payment could mean that care homes would have
to reduce their fees, unless they were able to provide the service to the resident
themselves and reclaim that part of the funding. Some larger care home organ-
isations with a mixed private and council-supported clientele felt they might be
able to absorb some of this risk, and others saw this as an opportunity to diversify
and expand their services in the community. However, care home managers and
owners who provided care to older people, those running smaller care homes and
those who accommodated a high number of residents on council funding felt
particularly threatened by the prospect of losing income through direct payments.
‘So the issue is, and the anxiety is, well look, the local authority rates are insufficient as it is now. If
you’re giving the option for a new resident to have all that money and then come and live with us
but not give all of us that money because they want to spend some money elsewhere, then we’re still
providing services to the resident; we’ve still got to have the right number of carers in the building
to make it safe for our duty of care.’ (Care home owner, Site 4)
The financial concerns of providers were seconded by some family members.
A family member of a person in a charitable care home noted that they would not
want to take money away from the care home as this might disadvantage other
service users, which they saw as contravening the charitable status of the home:
‘There’s no way that I would [take a direct payment] because I’m really quite angry about it because
my mum’s left with £23 a week [personal allowance], which is not enough anyway. If they were to
say ‘we’re going to give your mother another £10 a week to go in her pocket, but not rob it from
anybody else’, that would be great, but they’re not saying that . . . it’s robbing Peter to pay Paul.’
(Family member, Site 8)
Some family members felt that this potential reduction in provider funding
could affect the general quality of care if direct payment users were allowed to
shift monies away from care homes. A family member who declined a direct
payment feared that the direct payment could be a disadvantage to her family
member in future if the cost of care were to increase.
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‘We felt that if in the future, for instance, the care costs rose and that money [the part direct
payment] had already been committed to other things, that would cause [my brother] considerable
problems, if you follow that slightly weird line of logic.’ (Family member, Site 7)
Discussion
This analysis has explored the barriers to implementing direct payments in
residential care in England and the reasons behind the lower than expected uptake
of direct payments during the trailblazer scheme. Our analysis suggests that the
two narratives identified by Fernandez and colleagues in respect of domiciliary
care are both relevant for understanding the difficulties of implementing direct
payments in residential care.
Our findings confirm the key role of frontline staff in promoting direct
payments, echoing concerns about gatekeeping behaviour identified in the
literature (Carmichael and Brown, 2002; Spandler and Vick, 2006; Ellis, 2007;
Glendinning et al., 2008; Taylor, 2008). However the approach (to identifying
service users to whom direct payments were then offered) was also a result of
how the trailblazers had been initiated. Participants in the scheme were typically
selected by council staff or care homes on the basis that they were ‘suitable’
candidates (‘willing and able’) to accept a direct payment. This was in line
with the purpose of the trailblazing scheme, which set out to test how direct
payments could be implemented in residential care. In addition, as many sites
worked through providers to recruit service users, at least initially, care homes
also emerged as gatekeepers with some being more willing to promote direct
payments than others, and many expressing concern about the potential impact
of direct payments on care home finances if the scheme were to be rolled out. This
is unsurprising given the financial pressure on care home providers (Humphries
et al., 2016). Yet it contrasts with experience of direct payment in community care,
suggesting that care homes, at least in some areas and in a largely private market,
have more levers to resist implementation compared to home care workers, who
constitute a more individualised workforce.
Council frontline staff, as well as project leads, also faced difficulties in
convincing service users and their families of the potential benefits of direct
payments. Council staff explained the difficulty of ‘promoting’ direct payments
because of the lack of evidence of benefit to users and the absence of a consistent
narrative in support of direct payments in residential care. Questions were also
raised about the benefit derived from direct payment for residents whose ability to
exercise choice and control was limited, especially those with advanced dementia
or severe learning disability. While it was universally felt that all residents in care
homes should receive personalised care, it was often not clear how the direct
payment would enable this. These findings resonate with earlier concerns about
the appropriateness of direct payments for some individuals who may not want or
are not able to exercise choice (Law Commission, 2011; Glendinning et al., 2008).
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They challenge the idea that direct payments can improve personalisation for
everyone; instead the findings highlight the risk that direct payments can increase
the marginalisation of those with the highest levels of care need and dependency
(Ferguson, 2007; Lewis and West, 2014; Woolham et al., 2015).
Earlier research on the relevance of choice for people with disabilities has
shown that the existence of choice is only seen as meaningful if it is underpinned
by services to choose from (Rabiee and Glendinning, 2010). This was most
straightforward where a ‘full’ direct payment allowed for extended choice of
care home, although this typically involved additional cost to the council or the
service user’s family. For ‘part’ direct payments, younger adults with disabilities
who were in receipt of funding for day activities were among those who were able
to use their direct payment to participate in a wider range of activities. However,
for older people, the choice of services which could be funded through a direct
payment was less obvious, both in relation to the size of the direct payment and
the alternative services on offer to them. This finding underlines the relevance
of the second narrative that emphasises contextual factors such as differences in
funding available to council-funded care home residents with a direct payment.
As other examples of introducing ‘cash for care’ schemes for residents in care
homes have illustrated, an extension of user choice is unlikely to be ‘cost neutral’
(Angeles Tortosa and Granell, 2002).
Concerns about the impact of direct payments on care home finances proved
a major barrier to attracting providers to the scheme. These included concerns
about the risk of service users and families not paying their bills, service users
using the direct payment to purchase services outside the home, and the costs
associated with providing more personalised care within a funding context that
rewards economies of scale. While many care home managers stated that they
would like to provide care in a more person-centred, individualised way, they
also argued that the funding available from councils was often not sufficient to
achieve this, particularly for older people. Indeed, it is hard to see how direct
payments would not have an impact on care home funding unless users were in
receipt of a ‘full’ direct payment. A ‘full’ direct payment, however, just means
that the payment to the care home is made by the budget holder rather than
the council. This is unlikely to result in more choice for users although it could
give users and their families some sense of benefit if they attach intrinsic value to
receiving cash rather than care purchased for them.
Conclusions
This analysis has identified a number of reasons for the low uptake of direct
payments in residential care during a trailblazer scheme in England. These
include a lack of clarity about the benefits of direct payments to residents in care
homes with high care needs and limited capacity to exercise choice and control
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(i.e. become ‘customers’ to maximise their utility), and the supply of services
available to residents that would allow meaningful choices, relative to the size of
the direct payment. It also raises questions about the potential financial impact
of direct payments on care homes if the scheme were to be rolled out to enable
access to services beyond the care package provided by the care home.
This research suggests that, if direct payments are made available more widely
in England from 2020, then structural issues related to the care home market and
the funding for council-supported care need to be addressed before embarking on
a scheme that sets out ostensibly to improve users’ choice and control. However,
even if this were the case, there are still questions to be answered as to whether
people with high care needs and substantial dependency are able to benefit
from direct payments, given the reliance of direct payments on people’s capacity
to exercise choice and control. Because of the low uptake of direct payments
during the trailblazer scheme, it was not possible to measure user outcomes
with sufficient robustness. Yet the difficulty encountered during the trailblazers
suggests that the ambition that ‘more people [should be able to] experience the
benefits from direct payments’ set out in the 2012 White Paper may be harder to
achieve in residential care than expected.
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